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1966] CASES NOTED
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY IN A CIVIL SUIT OF A
PLEA OF GUILTY IN A CRIMINAL CASE
Plaintiff was injured by an automobile, driven by the individual
defendant, and owned by defendant-World Wide Rent-A-Car, under lease
to defendant-Olin's Rent-A-Car. During the trial, on cross-examination,
the plaintiff sought to elicit that the defendant had pleaded guilty to the
offense of driving too fast for conditions.' The trial judge allowed this
into evidence, over defendant's objection. The jury returned a verdict
for the plaintiff. On appeal to the First District Court of Appeal, held,
reversed and remanded: Since evidence of an adjudication of guilt in a
criminal case is inadmissible in a civil suit,2 the defendant's plea of guilty
is likewise inadmissible, because a guilty plea is synonymous with evi-
dence of a conviction. World Wide Rent-A-Car v. Boshnack, 184 So.2d
467 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
In this case, the court refused to differentiate between the admis-
sibility of a plea of guilty as an admission against interest, and its in-
admissibility as evidence of a criminal conviction. Admittedly, the court
was "unable to comprehend that distinction."3
This inability, resulting in the holding that a plea of guilty in a
criminal case is inadmissible in a related civil suit, has for the present4
placed Florida in the clear minority. Forty-three states have been pre-
sented with this question, and an overwhelming majority have held that
a plea of guilty is admissible.' Of the five minority states, four base their
1. The speed of the defendant's automobile was an issue in this case. The plaintiff's
attorney stated to the court that this testimony was being offered as an admission against
interest. World Wide Rent-A-Car v. Boshnack, 184 So.2d 467 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
2. Stevens v. Duke, 42 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1949).
3. World Wide Rent-A-Car v. Boshnack, supra note 1, at 469.
4. It should be noted that at the date of this writing, the appelee has petitioned the
Florida Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, and that briefs have been filed on the
jurisdictional issue. As yet, there has been no action by the supreme court.
5. Eschelbach v. William S. Scull Co., 293 F.2d 599 (3d Cir. 1961); Ritter v. Griswold,
2 Ala. App. 618, 56 So. 860 (Ct. App. 1911); Monsma v. Williams, 385 P.2d 107 (Alaska
1963); Hays v. Richardson, 95 Ariz. 263, 389 P.2d 260 (1964); Harbor v. Cambell, 235
Ark. 492, 360 S.W.2d 758 (1962); Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd., 25 Cal.
Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439 (1962); Gancy v. Dohna, 25 Conn. Supp. 138, 198 A.2d 66 (Super.
Ct. 1964); Boyd v. Hammond, 187 A.2d 413 (Del. 1963); Frost v. Hays, 146 A.2d 907 (D.C.
Munic. Ct. 1958); Webb v. May, 91 Ga. App. 437, 85 S.E.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1955);
McCottrell v. Benson, 32 Ill. App. 2d 367, 178 N.E.2d 144 (Ct. App. 1961); Dinmick v.
Folis, 123 Ind. App. 701, 111 N.E.2d 486 (Ct. App. 1953); Book v. Datema, 256 Iowa
1330, 131 N.W.2d 470 (1964); Musick v. Enos, 95 Kan. 397, 148 Pac. 624 (1915); Race v.
Chappell, 304 Ky. 788, 202 S.W.2d 626 (Ct. App. 1947); Smith v. Southern Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 134 So.2d 337 (La. Ct. App. 1961); Lipman Bros. Inc. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.,
149 Me. 199, 100 A.2d 246 (1953); Miller v. Hall, 161 Md. 111, 155 At. 327 (Ct. App.
1931); Morrissey v. Powell, 304 Mass. 268, 23 N.E.2d 411 (1939); Diamond v. Holstein, 373
Mich. 74, 127 N.W.2d 896 (1964); Keely v. Arkansas Motor Freight Lines, Inc., 278 S.W.2d
765 (Mo. 1955); Remmenga v. Selk, 152 Neb. 625, 42 N.W.2d 186 (1950); Weiss v. Wasser-
man, 91 N.H. 164, 15 A.2d 861 (1940); Vargas v. Clauser, 62 N.M. 405, 311 P.2d 381 (1957);
Ando v. Woodberry, 8 N.Y.2d 165, 168 N.E.2d 520, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74 (1960); Grant v.
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decisions on the interpretation of, and legislative intent behind, statutes6
which expressly disallow the admission in a civil suit of a record of con-
viction of a traffic violation. 7 Pennsylvania, the other minority jurisdic-
tion, statutorily bars the use of a plea of guilty.8
The majority of jurisdictions have uniformly recognized that a
plea of guilty is in the nature of an admission against interest;' more
specifically, a judicial admission. 10 This is easily justified, since a plea
of guilty is an admission of a wrong on the part of the defendant." This
case serves as an excellent example of this doctrine. The defendant was
charged with the crime of "driving his motor vehicle at a speed greater
Shadrick, 260 N.C. 674, 133 S.E.2d 457 (1963); Heid v. Shafer, 140 N.W.2d 584 (N.D.
1966); Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957); Zumwalt v. Moran,
260 P.2d 725 (Okla. 1953); Hazard v. Salles, 222 Ore. 559, 353 P.2d 548 (1960); Green v.
Boney, 233 S.C. 49, 103 S.E.2d 732 (1958); Berlin v. Berens, 76 S.D. 429, 80 N.W.2d 79
(1956); Darrow v. Texas Dep't of Public Safety, 392 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965);
Russ v. Good, 92 Vt. 202, 102 Ati. 481 (1917); Reynolds v. Donoho, 39 Wash. 2d 451, 236
P.2d 552 (1951); Moore v. Skyline Cab, Inc., 134 W. Va. 121, 59 S.E.2d 347 (1950);
Gaspord v. Hecht, 13 Wis. 2d 83, 108 N.W.2d 137 (1961).
6. COLO. REv. STAT. ch. 13, art. 2, § 13-5-137 (1953); IDAHO CODE, tit. 49, § 49-1119
(1953); MINN. STAT. § 169-94 subd. 1 (1940); UTAH CODE, it. 41, § 41-6-170 (1953). Most
of these statutes parallel the Utah Statute:
No record of the conviction of any person for any violation of this act [Motor
Vehicle Act] shall be admissible as evidence in any court in any civil action.
7. Ripple v. Brack, 132 Colo. 125, 286 P.2d 625 (1955) ; Jones v. Talbot, 87 Idaho 498,
394 P.2d 316 (1964); Warren v. Marsh, 215 Minn. 615, 11 N.W.2d 528 (1943); Utah Farm
Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 3 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957). Apparently Minnesota will
adhere to the majority rule in cases not involving traffic violations. Kvanli v. Village of
Watson, 139 N.W.2d 275 (Minn. 1965).
8. PA. STAT., ANN oT., tit. 75, § 1211 (1959):
A plea of guilty . . . in any summary proceedings before a magistrate shall be
inadmissible as evidence in every civil proceeding arising out of the same violations
or under the same facts or circumstances.
Pennsylvania presumably adheres to the same traffic-nontraffic dichotomy as Minnesota:
Tucker v. Standard Brand Distributors, 108 Pitts. Leg. J. N.S. 462 (1960).
9. Dean Wigmore has asserted:
The law of Evidence has suffered, in its most vital parts, from an ailment almost
incurable-that of confusion of nomenclature. 4 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 1058, p. 20
(3d ed. 1940).
In order that we may be immune from this ailment, the following definitions will be useful:
An admission is the voluntary acknowledgement by a party of the existence of the
truth of certain facts.
Roosevelt v. Smith, 17 Misc. 323, 325, 40 N.Y.S. 381, 383 (N.Y. City Ct. 1896); BLcK,
LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
An admission against interest is any statement of a party inconsistent with his claim
in an action.
Hoeffner v. Western Leather Clothing Co., 161 S.W.2d 722 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942).
10. A judicial admission, as opposed to an extra-judicial admission, is one made by a
party, of a material fact, appearing of record in the proceedings of a court. Marron v.
Helmeke, 100 Colo. 364, 67 P.2d 1034 (1937).
Dean Wigmore would use a dichotomy founded not on the location of the admission,
but rather on the legal use of it. Thus, he uses the term judicial admission to denote an
admission done in the course of the proceedings, which is a waiver of the production of
evidence. In other words, one which concedes that the proposition of fact alleged by the
opponent is true. An admission which is used as a proof, and is an item in the mass of
evidence, is labeled a quasi-admission. 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1058 (3d ed. 1940).
11. Konshuk v. Hayes, 150 Wash. 565, 273 Pac. 957 (1929).
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than was reasonable or prudent under the conditions 2 and having regard
to the actual and potential hazards then existing."' To this charge, he
pleaded guilty. It is apparent that, in so doing, he was voluntarily ac-
knowledging the existence of the truth of certain facts, i.e., the fact that
he was driving too fast for the conditions. Inasmuch as his speed was an
issue in the civil suit,'4 this avowal (of driving too fast for conditions) was
certainly inconsistent with his claim that he was not speeding. Thus,
clearly fitting the definition of an admission against interest, this plea
of guilty should have been admissible under that theory.'6
However, it has been established unquestionably, in Florida, that
evidence of a criminal conviction is, except for impeachment purposes,
inadmissible in a civil suit,' 7 and it cannot be disputed that "a plea of
guilty is as much a conviction as a verdict and judgment to that effect."'
All that remains to be done is the formal adjudication and sentencing.
It is on this supposition that most of the states with statutes barring the
admission of traffic convictions in civil suits have held that the plea of
guilty to the traffic conviction is also inadmissible.' 9 Thus, viewing the
plea of guilty as tantamount to a conviction, undoubtedly, it is inadmis-
sible in Florida.
20
Dean Wigmore has set forth what has been referred to by one
writer,21 as the "limited purpose" rule:
[W]hen an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose and be-
comes admissible by satisfying all the rules applicable to it in
that capacity, it is not inadmissible because it does not satisfy
the rules applicable to it in some other capacity.... .
The normal practice, when faced with the situation suggested by Wig-
more, is to admit the evidence and instruct the jury that they are to
consider the evidence only in the capacity in which it is admissible.23
However, as with any other rule, there are exceptions. If there is a great
risk of confusion, or the policy behind refusing its admission is strong,
the judge in his discretion may bar the evidence.24
12. The conditions at the time of the accident, approximately 7:00 P.M., were dark and
raining. Petitioners Brief on Jurisdiction, p. 2.
13. Id. at 3.
14. World Wide Rent-A-Car v. Boshnack, supra note 1.
15. Supra note 9.
16. Robinson v. Pepper, 94 Fla. 1184, 116 So. 4 (1928).
17. Stevens v. Duke, supra note 2.
18. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 7 Utah 2d 399, 404, 315 P.2d 277, 280 (1957).
19. See cases supra note 7; contra, Book v. Datema, 256 Iowa 1130, 131 N.W.2d 470
(1964). These statutes apparently reflect a strong public policy opposed to its admission
under any theory. See text following note 20, infra.
20. Stevens v. Duke, supra note 2.
21. 16 Note, SYRACUSE L. REV. 81 (1964).
22. 1 WiOmORE, EVIDENCE § 13, at p. 300 (3d ed. 1940).
23. McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 59 (1954).
24. Ibid.
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It is apparent from this discussion, that the plea of guilty fits into
this "limited purpose" definition, i.e., it is admissible as an admission
against interest, yet inadmissible on the basis that it would amount to
introducing a criminal conviction.
Prior to 1843 in England, the development of the exclusionary rule
had a very practical rationale, At that time, a witness could not testify
in his own behalf in a civil suit. If a party could introduce a criminal
conviction resulting from proceedings in which, likely as not, he had
testified, then, in effect, he was testifying in the civil suit. To avoid this
result the criminal conviction was held inadmissible to prove anything
other than its own rendition. 5 Although the Evidence Act of 1843 re-
moved this interest disqualification, the courts still adhered to the ex-
clusionary rule.26 These decisions were based on the maxim res inter
alios acta alteri nocere non debet27 It was not until 1911 that an English
court realized the misuse of this principle28 and rejected the exclusionary
rule.' However, this period of enlightenment was short lived because in
1943 England reverted to the exclusionary rule.80
The exclusionary rule followed a similar course in its development
in the United States. Beginning at an early stage in our legal history,81
it remained a hard and steadfast rule and, for the most part, went un-
challenged 2 until the early part of this century.
In 1927, the traditional rule was rejected in Eagle, Star & British
Dominion Ins. Co. v. Heller.88 There, the plaintiff after having been con-
victed of arson sued his fire insurance carrier to recover on his policy.
The insurance company was allowed to introduce his conviction as evi-
dence, and on appeal the Virginia Supreme Court held that the judg-
ment of conviction was conclusive evidence of the arson. The court stated
that
25. Gibson v. M'Carthy, Cast. Hard. 311, 95 Eng. Rep. 202 (K.B. 1736); Rex v.
Warden of the Fleet, Holt 133, 90 Eng. Rep. 972 (K.B. 1699).
26. Leyman v. Latimer, 47 L.J. 470 (Q.B. 1878); Yates v. Kyffin-Taylor, [1899]
Weekly N. 141.
27. A transaction between two parties ought not to operate to the disadvantage of a
third. BRoom, LEoAL MAXnms (7th ed. 1874).
28. The courts in citing and using this doctrine apparently fail to recognize that the
use of the transaction (the criminal proceeding) by the third party is to his advantage
rather than disadvantage. As a result, there were decisions which one finds difficult to
rationalize. For example, in Yates v. Kyffin-Taylor, supra note 25, the beneficiary killed the
testator and was convicted of her murder. The testator's next-of-kin in this action was
petitioning to have the beneficiary's interest forfeited (based on the maxim that one should
not be allowed to profit from his wrongdoing) and sought to use, as evidence, the murder
conviction. The court held that the conviction was inadmissible as proof that the beneficiary
committed the murder and the petitioner would have to prove this fact anew.
29. In Re Crippen, [1911] p. 108.
30. Hollington v. F. Hewthorn & Co., [19431 1 K.B. 587.
31. Quinn v. Quinn, 16 Vt. 425 (1844).
32. Annot., 31 A.L.R. 261 (1924).
33. 149 Va. 82, 140 S.E. 314 (1927).
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To permit a recovery under a policy of fire insurance by one
who had been convicted of burning the property insured would
be to disregard the contract, be illogical, would discredit the
administration of justice, defy public policy, shock the most
unenlightened conscience. 4
Although this case has not been followed to its fullest extent, i.e.,
holding the criminal conviction as conclusive, it has been a starting
point for a growing minority of states which allow admission of the crim-
inal conviction as prima facie evidence of the facts involved in the
criminal case.3 5 Thus a trend is apparently developing, at least to the
extent that one writer has said: "by and large, the rule [exclusionary]
seems to be on its way out... ." This trend was recognized by the Amer-
ican Law Institute and codified in the Model Code of Evidence.
37
The courts which adhere to the traditional rule rationalize their
decisions on various grounds. Some courts have relied on the hearsay
rule to exclude the conviction.8 Technically, the record of the convic-
tion does fall within the usual hearsay definition inasmuch as it is of-
fered to show the truth of the matters alleged, and derives its probative
value partially from the credibility and capacity of the out-of-court as-
serter.39 However, it is submitted that the substance of this objection is
more technical than real. Certainly, the official record is sufficiently
trustworthy evidence of the court's findings of fact and it must be re-
membered that the litigant had every opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses upon whose testimony the conviction was based. Furthermore,
it seems derogatory to our entire system of justice to characterize as mere
hearsay the decision of a court and jury by which an accused may have
been fined and imprisoned, or even executed.
Another argument asserted in favor of exclusion is the mutuality
idea, which is partially derived from the res inter alioS40 concept. Basi-
cally, the reasoning is:
No party is, as a general rule, bound in a subsequent proceed-
ing by a judgment, unless the adverse party now seeking to
34. Id. at 111, 140 S.E., at 323.
35. See, e.g., New York & Cuba Mail SS. Co. v. Continental Ins. Co., 117 F.2d 404 (2d
Cir. 1941); Page v. Skinner, 220 Ala. 302, 125 So. 36 (1929); Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co.,
258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932) ; Annot., 18 A.L.R.2d 1287 (1951).
36. Note, 39 VA. L. REV. 995, 998 (1953).
37. MODEL CoDE oF EVIDENCE rule 521 (1942).
Evidence of a subsisting judgment adjudging a person guilty of a crime or mis-
demeanor is admissible as tending to prove the facts recited therein and every fact
essential to sustain the judgment.
38. E.g., Manning v. Watson, 108 Cal. App. 2d 662, 239 P.2d. 693 (Ct. App. 1952);
Note, 27 ILL. L. REV. 195 (1932).
39. McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 225 (1954).
40. Supra note 26.
41. 1 Fmaars, JuDOMENs § 428, at p. 929 (Sth ed. 1925).
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secure the benefit of the former adjudication would have been
prejudiced by it had it been determined the other way.
41
While this reasoning has appeal in an equitable or fair-play context,
it loses this appeal when the question is merely one of admission of the
conviction. The idea is that one is not bound by a prior judgment which he
could not have used advantageously. However, this should not be inter-
preted to mean that it cannot be admitted at least as prima facie evi-
dence rather than as the basis of an estoppel. Under these circumstances,
the party against whom it is offered could always deny the validity of
its underlying facts and contest them with evidence of his own.42
A third view, and one which Florida has utilized43 to reach the re-
sult of exclusion is very general, and probably the weakest justification
for exclusion. This view is that the objects and procedures are different
in a criminal trial than in a civil suit.44 A cursory examination of this
argument reflects its fallacy, and in fact one could advance this very
same argument as a reason in favor of admission. As for the differences
in procedures, an accused in a criminal action is better protected than
the defendant in a civil suit. He must be proven guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt, statutes are construed in his favor, and he may refuse to
testify, without prejudice. Since the burden of proof is greater in a crim-
inal action than in a civil suit, the fact that the defendant's guilt has
been established beyond a reasonable doubt would seem to be a good
argument for admission, rather than for exclusion.
It is obvious that the argument is that no matter what theory is used,
there is little validity in the rationale of exclusion. Therefore, this policy
being a weak one, there is no reason why a plea of guilty should not
be admitted, at least in its capacity as an admission against interest.
However, there is another argument which would separate this rule into
traffic and non-traffic criminal offenses.4" The basis of this argument is
that, in most cases, a plea of guilty to a traffic violation is not an ad-
mission so much as a convenience. The defendant may be from out of
town or a businessman who does not have the time to spend in a traffic
court. The easiest and most convenient thing to do is plead guilty and
pay the fine. It was this view that led various states to enact statutes
barring the use of a traffic conviction in a civil suit.4"
While there is some merit to this argument, it must be noted that
the circumstances surrounding the plea of guilty are such that they do
42. Note, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 702 (1966).
43. Eggers v. Phillips Hardware Co., 88 So.2d 507 (Fla. 1956); Stevens v. Duke 42
So.2d 361 (Fla. 1949).
44. Interstate Dry Goods Stores v. Williamson, 91 W. Va. 156, 112 S.E. 301 (1922).
45. See, e.g., Ando v. Woodberry, 8 N.Y.2d 165, 168 N.E.2d 520, 203 N.Y.S.2d 74
(1960) (dissenting opinion) ; Note, 51 IOWA L. REv. 212 (1965)
46. Supra note 6.
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not go to the question of admission, but rather to the weight of the evi-
dence.47 The defendant has an opportunity to explain why he pleaded
guilty,4" and to possibly neutralize the use of the plea.
The proper rule, therefore, appears to be to allow the introduction
of the plea, with the judge having discretion to bar it if he is of the
opinion that its introduction, even as tempered by the adverse party's
explanation, would result in irreversible prejudice to the opponent.
JACK R. BLUMENFELD
THE AUTOMOBILE DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY
DOCTRINE: THE SCOPE OF CONSENT
The plaintiffs were awarded a money judgment against the defen-
dant-dealer and others for injuries and damages received in an auto-
mobile collision. The automobile was owned by the defendant-dealer and
was being driven by one of the co-defendants after he stole it, at the
time of the accident. On appeal to the First District Court of Appeal,
held, affirmed: A defendant-dealer is vicariously liable to third persons
for the negligence of his permittee under Florida's application of the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine to automobiles. Liability is placed
on a defendant-dealer who consents to the use of its automobile for a
"trial spin" even though the prospective purchaser takes the automobile
with intent to steal it.1 Tillman Chevrolet Co. v. Moore, 175 So.2d 794
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).2
A variety of doctrines have been formulated to impose financial
responsibility upon owners who allow others to use their vehicles. Under
common law theories, liability cannot be placed upon an owner merely
because he has legal title to an automobile involved in a negligence ac-
tion.' However, there are many situations when an owner is liable for
damages and injuries resulting from an accident involving his auto-
mobile. The owner4 who entrusts his vehicle to an incompetent is liable
47. 4 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE § 1059 (3d ed. 1940).
48. Ibid
1. The "prospective purchaser" allowed the defendant-hitchiker to drive and he
negligently injured the plaintiffs. It is clear from the opinion that the defendant-dealer
would have been liable even if the "prospective purchaser" had caused the accident.
2. A writ of certiorari taken from the appellate court decision was discharged on the
grounds that there was no conflict among the jurisdictions. Tillman Chevrolet Co. v.
Moore, 184 So.2d 175 (Fla. 1966).
3. 6 BLASHFiELD, AUTOMOBILE LAW & PRAcCE § 254.4 (3d ed. 1966). In particular
see the cases cited in n.36.
4. Generally ownership as referred herein does not only mean the legal title holder,
but also includes those who lawfully possess or control.
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